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Abstract This article examines the impact of the decisions in R v Dica (2004) and R v Konzani (2005) on the 
extent of the defence of consent. As well as analysing the impact of the decisions on the extent of the de-
fence where a defendant faces criminal liability for the transmission of sexual disease, it also considers and 
examines the wider issue of whether the presence or absence of consent forms part of the actus reus of the 
relevant assault offence or whether it is a separate and independent element that stands outside of the con-
duct component of the offence. It is argued that recent developments have given insufficient consideration to 
accepted doctrine and revived much criticised principles by focusing on unknown circumstances of justifica-
tion rather than the defendant's state of knowledge and mind. 
 
Consent as a defence 
 
The liability of a defendant for the transmission of sexual disease1 has attracted considerable attention as a 
result of R v Dica2 and R v Konzani.3 These decisions have raised some interesting issues concerned with 
the defence of consent. 
First, in dealing with the specific issues that arise in the cases, the Court of Appeal has also touched upon 
one of the cornerstones of general criminal liability. It has always been a matter of some debate and disa-
greement as to whether or not the presence or absence of consent forms part of the actus reus of the rele-
vant assault offence or whether it is a separate and independent element that stands outside of the conduct 
component of the offence. This may be a matter without any great practical significance but it has nonethe-
less stimulated debate on an interesting academic question of law and reflects some deeply embedded phil-
osophical differences. If 'absence of consent' is regarded as an ingredient of the conduct element of the of-
fence then, if the assault is consented to, a vital element is missing and there is no legal wrong of any kind. 
If, however, consent is seen as a defence falling outside of the actus reus then there remains a 'legal wrong' 
which, in the circumstances existing at the time, may be justified by the consent of the victim.4 
The former interpretation is supported by those legal scholars who emphasise the role that criminal law has 
in supporting a person's autonomy, i.e. there is no legal wrong if someone consents to conduct which harms 
no one other than themselves. No useful purpose is served by criminalising behaviour to which someone has 
freely consented and which harms no one else or wider society. The latter interpretation is supported by 
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those legal scholars who emphasise the role that criminal law has in protecting and supporting the wider 
moral codes that regulate society generally. The intentional or reckless infliction of harm on another person, 
even one who may consent, undermines society as a whole and such conduct should, generally speaking, 
be outlawed unless there are special circumstances which may justify it. The majority of legal opinion seems 
to favour the interpretation that consent operates as a defence outside the actus reus of the offence although 
there is considerable authority to the contrary.5 
Secondly, and as Weait has suggested,6 the criminalisation of the transmission of sexual disease raises 
fundamental questions about the purpose and function of criminal law as a tool of social control. It has also 
highlighted the ability and suitability (or inability and unsuitability) of criminal law to regulate an intimate and 
fundamental aspect of an individual's private life. It can be concluded that Konzani has opened up a door that 
could allow a defendant who acts with full mens rea to escape conviction and the consequences of his ac-
tions simply because the victim has acquired, perhaps from a third party, knowledge of his condition. Why 
would (or should) the criminal law excuse a culpable actor from conviction because unknown to him, she or 
he possesses knowledge of his condition. Is it right that a person who acts with full culpability and moral 
blameworthiness can evade conviction? 
 
The decisions in Dica and Konzani 
 
In Dica the defendant infected two sexual partners with the HIV virus. The defendant had not revealed his 
condition to his sexual partners and the Court of Appeal held that a sexual partner could not give effective 
consent to the risk of infection by merely consenting to sexual intercourse whilst in ignorance of D's condi-
tion. In Konzani, the defendant who was HIV+ had sexual intercourse with several women from whom he 
concealed his condition. The women became infected with the virus as a result of the intercourse. The con-
victions for inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to s. 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, 
were upheld. 
In relation to the defence of consent, the Court of Appeal stated: 
There is a critical distinction between taking a risk of the various, potentially adverse and possibly problem-
atic consequences of sexual intercourse, and giving an informed consent to the risk of infection with a fatal 
disease. For the complainant's consent to the risks of contracting the HIV virus to provide a defence, it is at 
least implicit from the reasoning in R v Dica, and the observations of Lord Woolf CJ in R v Barnes confirm, 
that her consent must be an informed consent. If that proposition is in doubt, we take this opportunity to em-
phasise it.7 
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal emphasised the personal autonomy of the victim stating: 
[T]he principle of her personal autonomy is not enhanced if he is exculpated when he recklessly transmits 
the HIV virus to her through consensual sexual intercourse. On any view, the concealment of this fact from 
her almost inevitably means that she is deceived. Her consent is not properly informed, and she cannot give 
an informed consent to something of which she is ignorant. Equally, her personal autonomy is not normally 
protected by allowing a defendant who knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus which he deliberately 
conceals, to assert an honest belief in his partner's informed consent to the risk of the transmission of the 
HIV virus. Silence in these circumstances is incongruous with honesty, or with a genuine belief that there is 
an informed consent.8 
It seems clear then that 'informed' consent (i.e. where the victim knows that the defendant is infected and 
has sexual intercourse aware of that fact) can act as a defence. Equally, it is apparent that the defendant 
may plead the defence of consent where he has an honest belief in the victim's consent. But what of a situa-
tion, which may well arise, where the victim has acquired knowledge of the defendant's condition by some 
other means but the defendant is completely ignorant of this fact?9 In other words, he proceeds with sexual 
intercourse knowing of his condition (and is therefore behaving recklessly) but in complete ignorance of the 
victim's level of awareness of his condition. Konzani suggests that the defence would be available in these 
circumstances. The Court of Appeal stated: 
[W]e accept that there may be circumstances in which it would be open to the jury to infer that, notwith-
standing that the defendant was reckless and concealed his condition from the complainant, she may never-
Page 3 
 
theless have given an informed consent to the risk of contracting the HIV virus. By way of example, an indi-
vidual with HIV may develop a sexual relationship with someone who knew him while he was in hospital, re-
ceiving treatment for the condition. If so, her informed consent ... would remain a defence, to be disproved by 
the prosecution, even if the defendant had not personally informed her of his condition. Even if she did not in 
fact consent, this example would illustrate the basis for an argument that he honestly believed in her in-
formed consent. Alternatively, he may honestly believe that his new sexual partner was told of his condition 
by someone known to them both. Cases like these, not too remote to be fanciful may arise.10 
If D recklessly (or intentionally) infects V through an act of sexual intercourse why should his criminal liability 
depend upon the state of mind of the victim--at least where he is ignorant of that state of mind? He acts with 
moral blameworthiness and moral culpability. His conduct is, arguably, deserving of the stigma of a criminal 
conviction and it seems somewhat illogical to absolve him from liability simply because the victim has ac-
quired knowledge of his condition from a source other than him. Does his culpability or blameworthiness 
disappear because of the victim's actual state of mind? It is submitted that it does not.11 It may be true that 
the personal autonomy of the victim is not compromised in these circumstances but should not the criminal 
law be concerned with something greater than personal autonomy? 
It is one of the functions of criminal law to convict and punish those who recklessly or intentionally inflict harm 
on other members of society yet in these circumstances, unlike other circumstances where the defence of 
consent operates, there appears to be no requirement that the defendant knew or honestly believed that the 
victim was consenting to the risk. Where the defence of consent is to operate, it should surely be limited to 
those situations where it removes the defendant's culpability and blameworthiness because he is aware that 
the victim has knowledge of the risk at the relevant time and is therefore consenting. In seemingly preferring 
the view that consent forms part of the actus reus of the offence, Konzani permits the morally culpable to 
avoid conviction and may leave the defendant's criminal liability dependent upon the chance fact of whether 
or not the 'victim' has an awareness, howsoever acquired, of his condition.12 
 
Revivification of Dadson-type principles 
 
A further difficulty arises from the reliance in Konzani on informed consent of the victim, whether obtained 
from hospital authorities or extraneous third parties, which as a consequence serves to insulate D from liabil-
ity for reckless transmission of HIV. The focus on victim awareness or conduct raises the spectre of unknown 
justification exculpating a defendant from liability.13 General principles of criminal liability, since the funda-
mental decision in Dadson,14 have been traditionally accepted as precluding reliance on such conceptual 
analysis. By sleight of hand, the illustrations presented by the Court of Appeal in Konzani unwittingly sup-
ports an unknown justification type argument on lack of actus reus ingredients. 
A corollary may be made in this respect between Konzani and Dadson. The supposition from Konzani is that 
reckless transmission of HIV may be rendered 'lawful' where wholly unknown to D an outside knowledge of 
status has been acquired by V. This resonates with unknown circumstances of justification. Consider, by way 
of hypothetical illustration, that D is driving past a bar when he sees P crossing the road ahead of him. He 
knows that P has been having an affair with his wife and so he deliberately drives his car at P intending to kill 
him; P is killed instantly. It is later discovered that P is a member of a terrorist gang and was about to throw a 
bomb into the crowded bar where it would almost certainly have caused death. Should D be treated as a 
criminal for his murderous intent against P or should he be treated as a hero for saving the customers in the 
bar? One may view this as an extremely unlikely situation, but the same problem arose in Dadson--D was 
charged with unlawfully and maliciously shooting at any person with intent to maim, disfigure or disable such 
person or to do some other grievous bodily harm to such person.15 It was a police officer whose patrol area 
included a copse from which there had been a large number of thefts of wood. D saw a person running away 
from the copse and he shouted to him to stop. When he failed to do so D shot and wounded the suspect. At 
that time it was considered perfectly lawful for an officer to shoot at an escaping felon to prevent his es-
cape.16 Stealing wood was a misdemeanour unless the accused had two previous convictions for stealing 
wood, in which case it became a felony.17 D had no reason to believe that this suspect had any previous 
convictions for stealing wood, but as a matter of fact he had, and therefore on this occasion he was an es-
caping felon. It is quite clear that the prosecution could establish that D had deliberately shot at the suspect 
with the necessary intent. It was, however, argued that since the suspect was, in fact, an escaping felon, the 
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shooting was not unlawful; in other words the prosecution had failed to prove all the elements of the of-
fence.18 On the face of it, this seems to be a good argument; it would appear that the killing is not in fact un-
lawful and, therefore, the prosecution cannot prove the existence of all elements. 
The Court for Crown Cases Reserved, however, upheld his conviction. Pollock CB said, 'The prosecutor 
(suspect) not having committed felony known to the prisoner at the time when he fired, the latter was not jus-
tified in firing at the prosecutor; he was guilty of shooting at the prisoner with intent to do him grievous bodily 
harm, and the conviction is right'.19 Thus, in Dadson, the prosecution could not prove that the shooting was 
unlawful. 
The answer lies in the nature of the defence of justification. What the court in Dadson said was that in certain 
circumstances the accused will be justified in inflicting grievous bodily harm or even death, but only if he is 
aware of the circumstances when he does the otherwise prohibited act.20 In contradistinction to Konzani the 
focus is on D's awareness/knowledge as a defence, and the perpetrator's state of mind, rather than unknown 
belief or circumstances attached to the victim. If the prosecution can establish that the accused was unaware 
of the circumstances which would constitute justification the defence fails and the prosecution have estab-
lished that the act was unlawful.21 So long as the accused is aware of the facts which justify the shooting he 
may rely on the defence; it would not matter that he was unaware that the law provided such a justification. 
Thus, if Dadson was aware that the suspect had two previous convictions for theft of wood, he would have 
been acquitted; it would not have mattered that he did not know that it was legal to shoot escaping felons. 
Professor Ormerod has cogently analysed the Dadson outcome in the following terms: 
D did not deny that he shot at V or that he intended to cause him grievous bodily harm. He admitted the 
necessary constituents of the crime (other than 'unlawfulness') but went on to assert other facts that, he al-
leged, made his act lawful. Whether his act was lawful depended on what were the constituents of the de-
fence that he raised; and the case decided that the defence, like duress and self-defence, required the as-
sertion not merely of external facts but also of a state of mind. A doctrine of actus reus which says that such 
a course must be wrong, as contravening a fundamental principle, is much too constricting. Whether the de-
fence should consist simply in the external facts, or in the facts plus the state of mind, is a matter of policy; 
and it was a not unreasonable decision of policy to say that a man who deliberately shot another should be 
guilty of an offence unless he knew of circumstances justifying or excusing his conduct. (emphasis sup-
plied)22 
In similar vein, paraphrasing Professor Ormerod's contention highlighted above, it would not be an unrea-
sonable decision of policy to require that an HIV-aware individual, recklessly engaging in sexual intercourse, 
should be guilty of an offence unless he knew of circumstances justifying or excusing his conduct. A revivi-
fied Dadson-type argument derived from unknown justification and victim awareness from extraneous third 
sources is palpably insufficient. It is over-generous in favour of a culpable defendant and arguably drives a 
coach and horses through accepted doctrine on 'informed consent' as a defence. 
 
Fraud vitiating consent 
 
The court in Konzani, as Weait asserts,23 made it clear that the wilful concealment of HIV status on the part 
of a defendant, 'almost inevitably means that V is deceived'.24 The implied rationale is that informed consent 
is not operable as, 'she cannot given an informed consent to something of which she is ignorant'.25 This 
raises the wider issue surrounding the nature of types of deception which vitiate consent as a defence. The 
overarching significance of this question arose in the important case of R v EB,26 regarding the offence of 
rape and deliberate concealment of HIV status. The ambit of fraud vitiating consent requires consideration 
under both legislative and common law principles. More specifically, at issue in R v EB, was whether an im-
plied deception was operative which vitiated consent under s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 or consti-
tuted a conclusive presumption as to lack of consent under s. 76 of that Act. 
In R v EB, D had approached V at a bus stop having been out socially with friends. They had, apparently, 
engaged in conversation and then walked together to a nearby street. Sexual intercourse occurred, but at 
trial the fundamental question under consideration was V's consent. V's contention was that she had been 
subjected to a truly dreadful assault. D was HIV positive and had had this status from September 2001, with 
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his full knowledge. D asserted that V did consent to the intercourse and that there were several witnesses to 
this, two of whom he called in support during the trial. At issue, inter alia, was the inclusionary nature of D's 
HIV status as a matter of evidence, and its import as a matter vitiating consent as an implied deception. 
While s. 75 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 deals with 'evidential presumptions', which can be rebutted by 
the defendant, s. 76 contains 'conclusive presumptions'. If the defendant is proved to have intentionally pen-
etrated the victim, and particular circumstances are proved to exist, the victim is presumed not to have con-
sented, and the defendant cannot rebut the presumption. The circumstances are set out in s. 76(2): 
 
   (a)     the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or purpose of the 
relevant act; 
 
   (b)     the defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to the relevant act by 
impersonating a person known personally to the complainant. (emphasis supplied) 
 
Section 76 builds on the common law position prior to the 2003 Act wherein consent was negatived only if 
the victim was mistaken about the nature of the act to which she was consenting or as to the identity of the 
person with whom she was consenting to have intercourse. The issue arose in the historic case of R v Flat-
tery.27 The defendant professed to give medical and surgical advice for money. The victim, a young woman 
of 19, consulted him with respect to an illness from which she was suffering. He advised that a surgical oper-
ation should be performed and, under pretence of performing it, had carnal connection with her. She submit-
ted to what was done, not with any intention that he should have sexual connection with her, but under the 
belief that he was merely treating her medically and performing a surgical operation, that belief being fraud-
ulently induced by the defendant. It was held that he was guilty of rape. It was stated by Field J that: 'The 
question is one of consent, or not consent; but the consent must be to sexual connexion. There was no such 
consent.'28 It is noteworthy that this decision was strongly criticised by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in his 
Digest of the Criminal Law,29 on the ground that it overruled the principle thought to persist at the time, 'that 
where consent is obtained by fraud the act does not amount to rape'. Stephen's view, however, was firmly 
rejected in Williams,30 a case where the defendant, a singing instructor, was held properly convicted of rape 
when he had sexual intercourse with a girl of 16 under the pretence that her breathing was not quite right 
and that he had to perform an operation to enable her to produce her voice properly. Consent obtained by 
fraud in these medical treatment cases was not a defence to rape or cognate offences. 
The next judicial step was taken in Clarence.31 The decision was simply that a husband who infects his wife 
with venereal disease (she said if she had known she would have refused consent) is not thereby guilty of 
inflicting grievous bodily harm under s. 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. However, more im-
portantly it led to the judges giving more general attention to what precisely was involved in the wife's con-
sent, and the types of fraud which would and would not vitiate consent to a non-fatal 'offence'. The funda-
mental dichotomy between the different types of fraud involved here was made by Wills J when he stated 
that: 
That consent obtained by fraud is no consent at all is not true as a general proposition either in fact or in law. 
If a man meets a woman in the street and knowingly gives her bad money in order to procure her consent to 
intercourse with him, he obtains her consent by fraud, but it would be childish to say that she did not consent 
... Take, for example, the case of a man without a single good quality, a gaol-bird, heartless, mean and cruel, 
without the smallest intention of doing anything but possessing himself of the person of his victim, but suc-
cessfully representing himself as a man of good family and connections prevented by some temporary ob-
stacle from contracting an immediate marriage, and with conscious hypocrisy acting the part of a devoted 
lover, and in this fashion, or perhaps under the guise of affected religious fervour, effecting the ruin of the 
victim. In all that induces consent there is not less difference between the man to whom the woman suppos-
es she is yielding herself and the man by whom she is really betrayed than there is between the man bodily 
sound and the man afflicted with a contagious disease.32 
A crucial distinction should thus be drawn here as to a consent given under a deception or mistake as to the 
thing itself, i.e. the act of sexual intercourse, and a consent to that act of sexual intercourse itself induced by 
a deception or mistake as to a matter antecedent or collateral thereto (fraud in the inducement does not de-
stroy the reality of the apparent consent; fraud in the factum does).33 Under the first category there will be 
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cases where the woman is deluded into supposing that she is undergoing medical treatment as in Flattery 
and Williams above, and the cases where in the dark she is induced to assume that it is her husband who is 
the man with whom she is having sexual intercourse such as Jackson.34 Within the second heading will 
come consent induced by fraudulent representations given by the man as to matters such as his wealth, lack 
of sexual infections, freedom to marry the woman or the promise to pay for the sexual services provided. It 
should be palpably clear that consent obtained through the device(s) of fraud of the latter type should still 
constitute a valid and subsisting consent. The correct line needs to be drawn over these quite different 
headings. 
In terms of Commonwealth authorities in this substantive arena the key decision remains that of the High 
Court of Australia in Papadimitropoulos.35 The issue, inter alia, was whether the defendant could be convict-
ed of rape when the 'victim' consented to sexual intercourse under the belief, fraudulently induced by the de-
fendant, that she was married to him, following a fake marriage ceremony. The High Court unanimously de-
cided that, whatever other offences may have been committed, the defendant was not guilty of rape. Their 
Lordships, stated quite categorically that the following principle applies: 
Rape is carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent: carnal knowledge is the physical fact of penetra-
tion; it is the consent to that which is in question; such a consent demands a perception as to what is about 
to take place, as to the identity of the man and the character of what he is doing. But once the consent is 
comprehending and actual the inducing causes cannot destroy its reality and leave the man guilty of rape. 
(emphasis supplied) 
The crux of the decision is that fundamentally there was consent to the act of sexual intercourse itself. The 
'victim' knew the nature of the act and the identity of the person and consented to sexual intercourse in full 
knowledge of those crucial determinants. The fraud itself related to an ancillary matter, i.e. the husband/wife 
relationship existing. 
In the light of their Lordships' decision it now seems clear that the earlier decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Bolduc and Bird36 can no longer be supported. It is incorrect in principle. Here a doctor (A) re-
quested the permission of his patient to the presence of (B), represented as a medical intern requiring expe-
rience, during the conduct of a vaginal examination on the patient. In reality B was simply an itinerant musi-
cian, not a medical student, and his presence there was simply to satisfy prurient interest. The convictions of 
both A and B for indecent assault were quashed. This was on the basis that there was no fraud on A's part 
on what he was supposed to do and actually did. The patient consented to a vaginal examination from A, she 
was not touched by B, and that was what she received. She consented to B's presence and the court held 
that there was no fraud as to the nature and quality of what was done. The dissenting judgment of Spence J 
though now seems to be crucial. Spence J said: 'Let us examine for a moment what was the consent ob-
tained from the complainant. Surely ... it was consent to the examination by A ... in the presence of a doctor, 
not a mere medical student or a layman ... She only gave this consent to such a serious invasion of her pri-
vacy on the basis that B was a doctor intending to commence medical practice and who desired medical ex-
perience ... That was the consent which the complainant granted'.37 Arguably there was fraud here both as to 
the nature of the act and identity of the person: that fraud should have vitiated consent and led to the convic-
tion of both A and B for indecent assault. 
It was long accepted that if a woman consented to intercourse with a man she wrongly believed to be her 
husband, there was no valid consent. It was not clear to what other relationships this rule extended. In 
Elbekkay,38 the complainant had lived with her boyfriend for about 18 months. On the night in question E was 
staying as a guest and all three had had too much to drink. During the course of the night the complainant 
became aware of someone touching her and felt herself being entered by a penis. For about 20 seconds she 
assumed it was her boyfriend, but then realised it was E. V thereupon punched E and cut him with a knife. At 
E's trial for rape the complainant alleged that she had consented only so long as she thought it was her boy-
friend. The Court of Appeal held that the rule was not restricted to the impersonation of husbands. Sexual 
intercourse is a highly personal act and it cannot be said that a woman who consents to intercourse with A 
has consented to intercourse with B. The amendments to s. 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, which were 
effected by s. 142 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, post-dated Elbekkay and there was no 
change to s. 1(3) which provides that a man commits rape if he induced a married woman to have sexual 
intercourse with him by impersonating her husband. Section 76(2)(b) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is a 
noticeable improvement on what went before, providing for a conclusive presumption of a lack of consent 
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where D impersonates 'a person known personally' to the complainant. It is not absolutely clear who counts 
as 'a person known personally to the complainant' for the purposes of s. 76(2)(b). While the section is de-
signed to deal with the defendant who impersonates a partner or spouse, it probably does not cover the de-
fendant who seeks to pass himself off as a famous person for the purposes of persuading the complainant to 
have sexual intercourse with him. Although the complainant may know who the famous person is, their 
knowledge of the famous person is not of a personal nature. 
At common law, fraud which did not induce a mistake about the nature of the act or of the identity of the man 
was irrelevant. Thus in Linekar,39 L persuaded a prostitute to have intercourse with him on the basis that she 
would receive a sum of money. After the intercourse he walked off without paying and she claimed that she 
had been raped. The Court of Appeal held that the issue was not that of fraud, but of whether the woman 
had consented to sexual intercourse with L. This she clearly had done; the fact that she would not have had 
intercourse but for the promise of money was irrelevant. There was no fraud relating to the nature of the act 
or to the identity of the person. It is clear that many people allow another to have intercourse with them be-
cause of some promise that has been made. This might be that the victim is offered money, status or mar-
riage in return for sexual intercourse. However, on one view, the position may now be different under s. 
76(2)(a) of the 2003 Act. The deception as to payment may be viewed as altering the nature or purpose of 
the act in question, consequently it could be argued that D should be classified as a rapist under the new 
provisions. If this represents the extant position, then it is a glaring anomaly. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 
ought to have incorporated an offence previously contained in s. 3(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 
whereby, 'it is an offence for a person to procure a woman, by false pretences or false representations, to 
have sexual intercourse in any part of the world'.40 This charge embodies the gravamen of the conduct, not 
rape. Failure to recognise this in the legislation is an unfortunate lacuna. 
In Tabassum,41 the parameters of consent obtained by fraud in the context of sexual activity were 
re-evaluated by the Court of Appeal. It was the prosecution case that D had asked several women to take 
part in a breast cancer survey he was carrying out in order to prepare a database software package to sell to 
the doctors. The three complainants consented to D showing them how to carry out a breast 
self-examination, which involved taking off their bras and allowing D to feel their breasts. D had no medical 
qualifications or training and each of the victims said that they had only consented because they thought he 
was so qualified. There was no evidence of a sexual motive. On behalf of the defendant, it was contended 
that the case should be discontinued on the premise that the complainants had undoubtedly consented, and 
such consent was not negatived by deception, except where identity was in issue and the nature and quality 
of the act done was different from that for which consent was given. Furthermore, it was submitted that lack 
of medical qualifications on the part of D did not change the nature and quality of the act, which was compa-
rable with what had been consented to by the women. 
The Court of Appeal, in upholding D's conviction, on three counts of indecent assault, determined that the 
women were consenting to touching for medical purposes and not indecent behaviour. Hence, there was 
consent to the nature of the act but not its quality. In the absence of a sexual motive, Tabassum would not be 
covered by s. 76(2)(a) of the 2003 Act, as there was no deception as to either the nature or the purpose of 
the relevant act. Moreover, it was fundamental that an intimate examination for the purpose of creating a da-
tabase by a medically qualified person is an act of a different quality from the same act done for the same 
purpose by a person not medically qualified. A by-product of the decision was that the outcome in Clarence 
was thrown into even graver doubt. The wife may have consented to sexual intercourse which was the na-
ture of the act, but following Tabassum it may be that she did not consent to the risk of contracting venereal 
disease which is embodied by the quality of the act. Similar analysis applied in Dica to the risk of HIV infec-
tion. 
Confusion now reigns as to which types of fraud vitiate consent in the context of sexual activity. The decision 
in Dica (infliction of grievous bodily harm within s. 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 where D 
recklessly conceals HIV status), following Tabassum, in allowing qualitative mistakes to negate consent is 
palpably inconsistent with a long line of authority dating back to Clarence. If qualitative errors destroy con-
sent at common law, then the logical corollary may be that the victim has endured either a rape or an as-
sault. The decision in R v EB, however, detailed below shows this may not be the case for legislative pur-
poses. If a qualitative error as to D's state of health destroys consent then, by parity of reasoning, other mis-
takes as to 'quality' also destroy consent. Embraced herein will be collateral matters such as suppression of 
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the truth as to D's lack of intention to pay for sexual services, D's wealth, or even a promise of marriage. The 
difficulty, of course, is that the core transaction itself has been the subject of consent. 
 
The outcome in R v EB 
 
Their Lordships, in R v EB,42 the leading judgment that of Latham LJ, were explicit that a dissonance applied 
between the offence of infliction of grievous bodily harm under s. 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 
1861 and rape.43 In the case of the former the reckless concealment of HIV status (see Dica and Konzani) 
and failure to inform V (informed consent), precludes D's ability to rely on V's consent to the risk of transmis-
sion. This preclusion applies, of course, unless V has received 'informed consent' of D's HIV+ status through 
extraneous sources or third party information. Further comment on the perversity of this unknown justification 
windfall for culpable defendants is rendered superfluous! In the latter scenario, however, of rape, there is no 
mention in the conclusive presumptions contained within s. 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 of 'implied 
deception'. It was not for the courts through 'implicit judicial legislation' to read this into the Act. Moreover, 
HIV status by itself cannot operate to vitiate consent within s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Latham LJ 
clearly stated44 that it was wrong to allow D's positive HIV status to go before the jury: '[A]ll we need to say is 
that, as a matter of law, the fact that the appellant may not have disclosed his HIV status is not a matter 
which could in any way be relevant to the issue of consent under Section 74 in relation to the sexual activity 
in this case'. It remains for later days to explore fully the nature of deceptions which vitiate consent. The am-
bit of common law applicability remains as opaque as ever. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has addressed the parameters of informed consent and transmission of sexual disease. It is 
suggested that the current position is delineated more by mud than by crystal; successful prediction of legit-
imate principles remains as likely as tattooing soap bubbles. The gateway to culpability opened in Konzani, 
derived from chance occurrence of 'victim' awareness from disparate sources, has skewed accepted doctrine 
in preferring the view that consent forms part of the actus reus of the offence. In truth, it ought to be D's 
awareness that is in issue. An awareness that V has knowledge of the risk at the relevant time and is there-
fore consenting to intercourse in an informed manner. The subliminal resonance of Konzani is to revivify a 
Dadson-type argument derived from unknown justification--principles rejected for over a century and a half. 
More generally, an examination of the contextual ambit of types of fraud vitiating consent presents a picture 
of beguiling obfuscation. 
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